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Abstract
This study analyzes the relationship between the amount of research and development (R&D) spending in private 
US biopharmaceutical firms before they go public and whether or not these firms tap into external sources of 
funding for investment before an initial public offering. We focus our study on three specific sources of funding 
(venture capital investors, biopharmaceutical firm investors and strategic alliance partners) for two different time 
periods (one year prior to firms going public and cumulative years prior to going public). We found an increase in 
R&D spending over the course of the study and a positive relationship between R&D spending in the year prior to 
its going public and venture capital involvement. We also found a positive relationship between the cumulative 
amount spent on R&D and venture capital involvement and ownership by other biopharmaceutical firms. We use 
the literature on tradable assets and signaling theory to interpret the implications of our findings. For managers, 
the results suggest that if their goal is to send signals to future investors by way of spending greater amounts on 
R&D in the year prior to going public, then venture capital investors are more likely to be associated with this type 
of activity.
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Increasingly, medical innovation is having a 
profound effect on Americans ’ lives. Perhaps, 
nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
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biopharmaceutical industry (that is, 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical fi rms) 
where new disruptive technologies and drugs 
are creating a paradigm shift for both 
developers of drugs and providers of patient 
care. 1 With this shift has come new private-
public relationships that are transforming 
communities as states, academia, corporations 
and fi nanciers have sought to create 
geographic clusters for this industry. 2 – 4 These 
shifts have also fueled rising biopharmaceutical 
costs as Americans in 2006 spent fi ve times 
more on drugs and therapies than they did in 
1990. 5 US biopharmaceutical fi rms also spent 
approximately fi ve times more on research 
and development (R & D) in 2003 compared 
with 1990 6 and more than US $ 65 billion on 
R & D in 2008 alone. 7 The majority of these 
R & D efforts, however, never make it to 
market 8 and for those few that do make it to 
market, most are not profi table. 9 Yet despite 
these increased efforts, we know very little 
about these phenomena. 10 
 Seeking to expand our knowledge, this 
article examines two critical functions of new 
biopharmaceutical fi rms: R & D spending and 
the fi nancing of this R & D spending. Our 
central premise is that given the cost 
requirements of new drug development, it is 
logical to suppose that those fi rms engaging in 
drug discovery and development with greater 
access to suppliers of resources (for example, 
venture capitalists, biopharmaceutical fi rm 
investors and strategic alliance partners) would 
also spend greater amounts on R & D before 
going public. 
 We choose new private biopharmaceutical 
fi rms to study because early in the life cycle 
of these fi rms the majority of funds available 
are dedicated to R & D activities. 11 We 
investigate these fi rms at the time that they 
are seeking to go public, as research suggests 
that this is the time when fi rms are most in 
need of funding and represents a milestone 
event for many fi rms in this industry. 12 In 
particular, we are interested in discerning the 
amount of funds spent on R & D by these new 
fi rms in the year prior to their going public, 
the cumulative amount spent on R & D prior 
to their going public, and which investors 
affect these amounts spent on R & D. 
 We incorporate work on tradable assets 13 
and signaling theory 14,15 in discussing our 
results to help explain differences in the 
relationships between investors and the 
amount spent on R & D for each of the two 
periods preceding the initial public offering 
(IPO). Specifi cally, we suggest that fi rms 
engaged in R & D that is supported by pre-
IPO investors may send positive signals to 
post-IPO investors because of their higher 
levels of R & D spending. Our work should be 
of interest to researchers and practitioners 
trying to understand the amount spent on 
R & D of private fi rms seeking to go public 
and their sources of capital. 
 METHODOLOGY 
 Data collection method 
 Our sample represents US biopharmaceutical 
fi rms that went public for the fi rst time 
between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 
2007. Beginning in 1996, the Security  & 
Exchange Commission ’ s (SEC) internet site 
made publicly available the fi lings of all fi rms 
that were either publicly traded (for example, 
New York Stock Exchange; NASDAQ) or 
were fi ling to become publicly traded fi rms. 
We found most of the biopharmaceutical 
IPOs on the SEC ’ s internet site; other sources 
accessed on the internet were  Bio.org , 
Biospace, BioWorld, Edgar-Online, Ernst  & 
Young, Hoover ’ s and IPO Resources. We 
also read all news articles during this period 
related to public offerings from  Biospace.com 
to ensure that all biopharmaceutical fi rms 
going public were captured. Plant and animal 
fi rms and foreign fi rms fi ling an F-1 foreign 
fi rm ’ s registration statement were excluded. 
We included a small number of fi rms in our 
sample that appear to be foreign fi rms, but are 
incorporated in the United States and fi led an 
S-1 general registration statement for US 
fi rms. In addition, we excluded fi rms that did 
not receive any direct proceeds from the sale 
total assets), age, stage of clinical trial of the 
most developed or lead product, and number 
of US patents under the control of the fi rm. 
Our independent variables are venture capital 
investment, pharmaceutical ownership interest 
and strategic alliances that pay or promise to 
pay the biopharmaceutical fi rm a fee (that is, 
an initial, milestone or royalty fee). To 
determine venture capital investment, we 
cross-matched fi rms with individuals listed in 
the Principal Stockholders section of Pratt ’ s 
Guide to Venture Capital Sources. 16 Multiple 
linear regressions were used to analyze these 
relationships for Drug fi rms. 
 RESULTS 
 Figure 1 illustrates the average fi rm ’ s R & D 
spending by year. Consistent with Golec and 
Vernon ’ s 6 study of all publicly traded drug 
fi rms, we found a steep increase in spending 
by the average fi rm over the course of the 
study. Of the 215 Drug and Complement 
fi rms, the average fi rm spent almost  $ 12 
million on R & D in the year prior to its going 
public. The average Drug fi rm ( N  =  158) 
spent  $ 13.5 million on R & D compared to the 
average Complement fi rm ( N  =  57) which 
spent  $ 7.2 million on R & D. Between the 
years 1996 and 2001, the average Drug 
company ( N  =  75) spent  $ 8.5 million on 
R & D; whereas between the years 2002 and 
2007 the average Drug company ( N  =  83) 
spent  $ 18.4 million on R & D. Given the age 
(7.4) and stage of clinical trials (2.2) for the 
typical Drug fi rm, this R & D fi nding did not 
appear to us to be an extraordinary amount in 
light of the fi ndings related to costs and 
spending overall. 
 For informational purposes, we provide the 
total or cumulative amount of funds the Drug 
fi rms spent on R & D - from their conception 
to the end of the fi scal year just before their 
IPO.  Figure 2 illustrates by year the average 
cumulative amount of R & D each of the Drug 
fi rms spent. Many of the fi rms ( N  =  38), 
however, provided only partial data. Thus, 
within  Figure 2 we see only the Drug fi rms 
that provided data for all years ( N  =  120). 
of their stock, but rather had the capital raised 
going solely to individual investors. As the 
SEC fi lings do not readily convey the date a 
fi rm goes public, we checked  fi nance.yahoo.
com and the appropriate stock exchanges ’ (for 
example, NASDAQ) websites to fi nd and 
verify the date the fi rm ’ s stock traded for the 
fi rst time. 
 Sample 
 Similar to Golec and Vernon, 6 we use US 
biopharmaceutical drug fi rms as they represent 
the fi rms creating new end-products for 
human consumption ( N  =  158). These are 
fi rms with standard industrial classifi cation 
(SIC) codes 2834 (Pharmaceutical 
Preparations) and 2836 (Biological Products). 
For informational purposes, we provide data 
related to two different time-frames (for 
example, 1996 – 2001 and 2002 – 2007) to 
explore the effects, if any, of the increase in 
venture capital investment in this industry. 
We also provide initial data on 
biopharmaceutical drug fi rms that are 
complements which include SIC codes: 2833 
(Medicinal Chemicals  & Botanical Products), 
2835 (In Vitro  & In Vivo Diagnostic 
Substances), 3826 (Laboratory Analytical 
Instruments), 3829 (Measuring  & Controlling 
Devices), 3841 (Surgical  & Medical 
Instruments  & Apparatus), 5122 (Wholesale-
Drugs), 7371 (Services-Computer 
Programming Services), 7372 (Services-
Prepackaged Software), 7389 (Services-
Business Services), 8071 (Services-Medical 
Laboratories) and 8731 (Services-Commercial 
Physical  & Biological Research). Our total 
sample of biopharmaceutical IPOs represented 
215 fi rms of which 158 were classifi ed as 
 ‘ Drugs ’ and 57 as  ‘ Complements ’ . 
 Measures and statistical method 
 Our data come from the fi rm ’ s prospectus as 
fi led with the SEC. The dependent variables 
are R & D expense by the fi rm in the year 
prior to its going public and the cumulative 
R & D expense of the fi rm prior to its IPO. 
We control for the fi rm ’ s size (measured as 
 Figure 2 does not show data for the Drug 
fi rms that provided only 5 years worth of 
Data ( N  =  34) (that is, only the last fi ve fi scal 
years prior to their IPO) nor the four fi rms 
that provided either 1 ( N  =  1) or 3 ( N  =  3) 
years worth of R & D data. These four fi rms 
averaged about  $ 31.1 million in R & D 
spending. For the Drug fi rms that provided 
only 5 years worth of R & D spending data, 
these fi rms spent on average  $ 70.1 million in 
the 5 years prior to their IPO, with the 
average age of these fi rms being about 11 
years old (thus, we do not have 5 – 6 years 
worth of data on average for these fi rms). Of 
note, in 2002, there was only one fi rm that 
provided 5 years worth of data and it spent 
 $ 243.7 million over the course of these 5 years 
(and a fi rm in 2004 that spent  $ 271.4 million). 
When we delete these two fi rms from the 
fi rms presenting 5 years worth of data, we 
have the typical fi rm ( N  =  32) spending  $ 57.3 
million on R & D over the last 5 fi scal years 
prior to their IPO. Although not depicted, the 
trend for fi rms with 5 years worth of data was 
that they were spending more on R & D 
cumulatively in recent periods. 
 For the Drug fi rms that provided complete 
R & D spending data beginning with the fi rm ’ s 
 Figure 1 :   Average R & D spending per year.  
 Note :  N  =  215. 
 Figure 2 :   Cumulative R & D spending (in millions).  
 Note :  N  =  120. 
per cent of the variance in R & D spending 
( F  =  17.761,  P  =  0.000). Our fi ndings do not 
show that investment by other 
biopharmaceutical fi rms or participation in 
strategic alliances was related to greater R & D 
investment. Interestingly, though not 
statistically signifi cant, the variable for other 
biopharmaceutical investors had a negative 
relationship with R & D spending. 17,18 
 As an additional step in the analysis we 
examined relationships between R & D 
spending and our independent variables over 
time. Specifi cally, we wanted to see what 
effect, if any, the increased venture capital 
interest in this industry would have. 
Beginning in the year 1999, venture capital 
moved from internet fi rms into 
biopharmaceuticals fi rms in large numbers. 
The second and third columns in  Table 1 
show drug fi rms divided by two 6-year time 
periods: 1996 through 2001 and 2002 through 
2007. From this, we can see a statistically 
signifi cant relationship between R & D 
spending and venture capital investment in 
the years 1996 through 2001, but do not see 
a statistically signifi cant fi nding in the years 
2002 through 2007. 
 The last three columns in  Table 1 present 
the results from our multiple linear regression 
related to cumulative R & D spending for drug 
fi rms ( N  =  120). We found a positive 
inception ( N  =  120), the average fi rm spent 
approximately  $ 25.8 million cumulatively on 
R & D prior to its going public, with the 
average age of the fi rm being about 6 years 
old. Of the Drug fi rms that went public 
between 1996 and 2001 ( N  =  61), the typical 
fi rm cumulatively spent  $ 18.1 million on 
R & D compared to the Drug fi rms that went 
public between 2002 and 2007 ( N  =  59) that 
cumulatively spent  $ 38.3 million on R & D. As 
we can see from  Figure 2 (and similar to 
 Figure 1 ), the trend has been for increased 
amounts of cumulative R & D spending. 
 We excluded eight outliers from our 
original sample of 158 Drug fi rms leaving us 
with 150 Drug fi rms.  Table 1 presents the 
results from our multiple linear regressions for 
Drug fi rms. The fi rst three columns present 
our fi ndings related to R & D spending in the 
year prior to the IPO and the last three 
columns present our fi ndings related to 
cumulative R & D spending. As presented in 
the fi rst column, we fi nd a positive statistically 
signifi cant relationship between R & D 
spending in the year prior to the fi rm going 
public and the total assets of the fi rm, and 
venture capital investment ( N  =  150). This 
fi nding supports the view that fi rms with 
access to venture capital investors spend more 
on R & D than fi rms without venture capital 
investors. Our regression model explains 46.7 
 Table 1 :  Multiple regression results 
 Predictor variables 
 1 year prior 
drug fi rms 
(1996 – 2007) 
 1 year prior 
drug fi rms 
(1996 – 2001) 
 1 year prior 
drug fi rms 
(2002 – 2007) 
 Cumulative 
drug fi rms 
(1996 – 2007) 
 Cumulative 
drug fi rms 
(1996 – 2001) 
 Cumulative 
drug fi rms 
(2002 – 2007) 
 Coeffi cient 
estimates 
 Coeffi cient 
estimates 
 Coeffi cient 
estimates 
 Coeffi cient 
estimates 
 Coeffi cient 
estimates 
 Coeffi cient 
estimates 
 Age 0.041 0.239*   −  0.030  0.263**  0.332**  0.219 
 Assets (log)  0.606**  0.646**  0.451**  0.097 0.029  0.375** 
 Clinical trials  0.015 0.140   −  0.154 0.156  0.399**   −  0.216 
 Patents (log)  0.093   −  0.187* 0.177  0.146   −  0.083 0.193 
 Venture Capital  0.131*  0.319**   −  0.053  0.256**  0.395**   −  0.020 
 Biopharmaceuticals   −  0.049   −  0.119 0.096  0.177*  0.218* 0.179 
 Alliances 0.026 0.163 0.054  0.022  0.324**   −  0.217 
 N  150 70 80 120 61 59 
 R 2  0.467 0.629 0.271  0.260 0.482 0.253 
 Coeffi cient estimates are Standardized *Signifi cant at the 0.05 level; **Signifi cant at the 0.01 level. 
statistically signifi cant relationship between 
cumulative R & D spending and age of the 
fi rm, venture capital investment and 
biopharmaceutical investment. This fi nding 
supports the view related to fi rms with access 
to venture capital and biopharmaceutical 
investors spending more on R & D 
cumulatively than fi rms without these types of 
investors. Our regression model explains 26.0 
per cent of the variance in cumulative R & D 
spending ( F  =  5.584,  P  =  0.000). Our fi ndings 
do not show that fi rms with strategic alliance 
partners invest more in R & D. 
 DISCUSSION 
 The present study takes a fi rst step toward 
understanding investments in R & D by private 
biopharmaceutical fi rms seeking to go public. 
We consider this an area of growing 
importance, as there are approximately 1100 
private biopharmaceutical fi rms in the United 
States, many of which may go public in the 
near future or be acquired by other 
biopharmaceutical fi rms seeking to supplement 
their drug pipelines or add to their R & D 
capability. 12 As expected, we fi nd that fi rms 
receiving funding from venture capital fi rms 
tend to spend more on R & D at this time 
than fi rms without venture capital funding. 
There were no statistically signifi cant 
relationships found between R & D investment 
in the year preceding the IPO and 
biopharmaceutical fi rm investment or 
participation in strategic alliances. This is not 
exactly the case for cumulative amounts of 
R & D spending. Firms with venture capital 
and other biopharmaceutical fi rm investors 
spend greater amounts cumulatively on R & D 
than those that do not have these types of 
investors. 
 The implication for biopharmaceutical fi rms 
seeking to go public is that if they wish to 
spend more on R & D cumulatively, then they 
may need venture capital and / or other 
biopharmaceutical fi rm investors. However, if 
their primary goal is to spend greater amounts 
of funds on R & D just before going public, 
then it may be more advantageous to have 
venture capital investors than other 
biopharmaceutical fi rms, as either owners or 
strategic alliance partners. In other words, it 
appears that over time fi rms that wish to 
spend more on R & D need access to multiple 
sources of capital. Given the costs, venture 
capital alone may not be suffi cient to 
capitalize ongoing R & D in the long term in 
this industry. 
 Dierickx and Cool 13 suggest that fi rms 
deploy both tradable and non-tradable assets. 
Venture capitalist may view their investment 
solely in terms of tradable assets (for example, 
a fi rm). Biopharmaceutical fi rms may view 
their investment needs in terms of both 
tradable and non-tradable assets. Strategic 
alliances may represent a mechanism for 
biopharmaceutical fi rms to invest in specifi c 
tradable assets (for example, technologies). 
When considering buying non-tradable assets 
such as R & D capability, they have to invest 
in a tradable asset such as the fi rm itself. 
Thus, biopharmaceutical fi rm investors may 
employ two different strategies for two 
distinct purposes: acquisition of specifi c 
technology by way of strategic alliances, and 
acquisition of R & D capability by way of 
acquisition of the fi rm ’ s common stock. 
 Given this, our fi ndings would suggest that 
biopharmaceutical fi rms follow the same type 
of process for both internal and external non-
tradable resources. In other words, fi rms may 
follow a prescribed, time-phased fl ow process 
in which they develop, accumulate and 
deploy tradable and non-tradable assets. Thus, 
biopharmaceutical fi rms investing in other 
biopharmaceutical fi rms invest in order to 
acquire the non-tradable asset of R & D 
capability, and they follow similar investment 
logic externally as they do internally. Hence, 
these fi rms may view competitive advantage 
also being built through R & D capability, 
which is a cumulative (not single year) 
process. 
 Signaling theory may also help to interpret 
our fi ndings. Proponents of this tradition 
suggest that signals convey market value to 
IPO investors. 19,20 From this perspective, an 
entry. The IPO provides an exit vehicle for 
the venture capitalists, but for the 
biopharmaceutical fi rm investor, the IPO 
merely may represent another means in which 
to raise capital until a fi rm ’ s product(s) is 
further developed; at that point, the 
biopharmaceutical fi rm investor may make the 
decision to purchase the fi rm or make a 
milestone payment. Hence, biopharmaceutical 
fi rm investors may be less concerned about 
 ‘ signals ’ (which may be what the negative 
direction of the biopharmaceutical fi rm ’ s 
ownership interest variable is indicating in the 
one year prior to IPO model) and may 
represent a more focused approach to R & D 
spending on the part of other 
biopharmaceutical fi rms. This is congruent 
with our discussion above that noted that 
biopharmaceutical fi rms invest in different 
ways for tradable and non-tradable assets. 
 Furthermore, given the fact that fewer 
fi rms are going public of late, another 
implication for practitioners is that private 
biopharmaceutical fi rms may need to rely to a 
greater extent on their pre-IPO investors for a 
longer period of time. This may require an 
increase in the number and type of pre-IPO 
investors (for example, venture capitalists, 
other biopharmaceutical fi rms) and inevitably 
may increase the cumulative amount of R & D 
spent before the IPO. This increase in funds 
over time may mean fi rms are less able to 
raise the volume of the signal in the year 
prior to the IPO. These implications are 
dependent upon the duration of the 
slowdown in the IPO market. 
 There also may be an alternative (and 
opposite) explanation that is related to our 
fi ndings and the IPO itself. Our fi ndings from 
the two regression models may mean that the 
other biopharmaceutical fi rms are less likely to 
invest further in the company, which creates 
the need to go public. Our results taken 
together show that biopharmaceutical fi rms 
over time are signifi cantly associated with 
R & D spending, but not in the year prior to 
the IPO. This may suggest that they have lost 
interest in the fi rm or are unwilling to invest 
interpretation of our fi ndings may be that the 
fi rms with venture capital investment are 
trying to raise the volume of the  ‘ signals ’ . The 
means of raising this volume of the signal may 
be through the staging of investments. 21 
 Pharmaceutical fi rms and venture capitalists 
 ‘ stage ’ their investments. Pharmaceutical fi rms 
engaged in strategic alliances stage their 
investments primarily based on milestone 
payments related to a product moving 
through the clinical trial process. For example, 
as a product moves from stage I to stage II of 
clinical trials the pharmaceutical fi rm may pay 
the nascent biopharmaceutical fi rm a pre-
arranged payment to further the development 
of this product. Announcements of these 
changes in the product development efforts of 
biopharmaceutical fi rms can bring about 
changes in their stock market value. 22,23 In 
addition to clinical advancements, venture 
capital fi rms also stage their investments based 
on other factors such as hiring management, 
establishing a board of directors and attracting 
additional investors. 24 A possible explanation 
of these results could suggest that venture 
capitalists may also stage their investments to 
coincide with an IPO, understanding that the 
potential payback period for such an 
investment is relatively short as venture 
capitalists typically divest themselves of their 
stock after the IPO and its  ‘ lock-up ’ period. 
 These signals may be of less importance to 
biopharmaceutical fi rms that invest in other 
biopharmaceutical fi rms because of their 
different purposes for investment. As noted 
above, biopharmaceutical fi rms invest in other 
fi rms in order to acquire the fi rm ’ s 
technology or the fi rm itself in order to 
supplement resources and capabilities. Venture 
capitalists act as fi nancial intermediaries 25 until 
other private or public investors acquire their 
shares. Thus, the intention of investment by 
venture capitalists and biopharmaceutical fi rms 
might be different and may result in different 
levels of investment and at different times (for 
example, stages). This is to say that venture 
capitalists have an eye toward exit, whereas 
biopharmaceutical fi rms have an eye toward 
further. This may mean a negative signal to 
IPO investors; clearly, more research is 
needed in this area. 
 Limitations and conclusion 
 There are some limitations to our study. As 
we have studied only US biopharmaceutical 
fi rms, we do not know if our study ’ s results 
are generalizable to other industries or fi rms 
in other countries. We study only fi rms going 
public as opposed to other private fi rms. The 
performance (that is, drugs developed or 
clinical libraries) related to these R & D 
expenditures is also unknown. Neither is the 
study very fi ne-grained, as we do not take 
into account the number of products pursued 
by the fi rms nor the amounts spent on each 
drug / therapy being pursued or the therapeutic 
class of the end-product. We did not examine 
the amounts invested by each type of 
investor. We also combine both 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology fi rms 
together, though the technology and 
knowledge related to both segments of this 
industry is different and at different stages of 
development. Thus, there are other factors 
worth understanding regarding these fi ndings, 
fi rms and industry. 
 In summary, the present study has 
examined factors associated with R & D 
spending of private biopharmaceutical fi rms 
prior to their going public. Similar to other 
work on large biopharmaceutical fi rms, our 
results show that emerging biopharmaceutical 
fi rms are spending increasing amounts of 
funds on R & D. Additionally, fi rms with 
venture capitalists and other biopharmaceutical 
fi rms are associated with higher cumulative 
R & D spending prior to their going public, 
but only venture capitalists are associated with 
higher R & D spending in the year prior to the 
IPO. The study ’ s results add to our 
knowledge concerning nascent 
biopharmaceutical fi rms ’ R & D expenditures 
and their relationship to their sources of 
capital. Based on these and other studies ’ 
fi ndings related to biopharmaceutical 
spending, we can assume that the paradigm 
shift in new drug development and patient 
care attributable to biopharmaceutical products 
will continue into the future for some time to 
come. 
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